Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity

" . . . die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt., 1 he aim of Twentieth century phenomenology is to provide a non- T psychologistic interpretation of subjectivity. Husserl agrees with Frege; to adopt psychologism is to give up truth. But this should not prevent us from investigating the subjective perspective. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that an appropriate rejection of psychologism must be able to show how propositions are correlated to and grounded in subjective intuitions without thereby reducing them to psychological phenomena. Obviously this calls for an interpretation of subjectivity that makes a sharp distinction between the subjective perspective and the psychological realm. Phenomenology is devoted to the development of a notion of subjectivity that is in accordance with our experience of the world. A fundamental tenet of phenomenology is that philosophy should not dispute this experience but rather account for it. Hence, phenomenology must avoid a notion of subjectivity in which it becomes a problem to account for how a subject can ever hook up with the world. In other words, a phenomenological interpretation of subjectivity must radically disassociate itself from what is often referred to as a worldless, Cartesian subject, a res cogitans. But neither can an interpretation of SUbjectivity consistently advocate a position according to which the human order is described only in the categories appropriate to the physical order. Such an interpretation is obviously not compatible with the phenomenal basis for undertaking this very interpretation, that is, our experience of the world.